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Union and Management Decision-Making 
in the Grievance Process 
David A. Peach 
Based on a study of five U.S. Steel Company, this 
paper explains union-management interactions in the grie-
vance process. 
This paper is based on a study done during 1967 and 1968 in five 
U.S. Steel companies. The research, conducted under a grant by the 
American Iron and Steel Institute, was designed to develop an explanation 
for differing grievance rates between departments in the same plant and 
from that, a model differentiating high - and low-grievance - rate depart-
ments in gênerai. The research involved the examination of grievance 
records, interviews and observations over a span of about six weeks in 
two departments at five locations. 
While the focus of this research was not on decision-making, per se, 
the two decision-making processes - union and management - were 
influential in determining relative grievance rates and as a resuit, were a 
focus for observation and analysis. At the outset, however, note should 
be taken that the following comments are based on observations in a 
single industry (steel) and a single international union (United Steel-
workers). While I believe that the conclusions are generally applicable, 
at least to manufacturing, slight modifications might well hâve to be made 
to accommodate industry and union différences. 
One way of looking at Union-Ma-
nagement relationships is as a séries 
of challenge - response interactions ; 
union challenge and management 
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response. Two types of union challenges may be differentiated. ; the 
negotiation challenge and the grievance challenge. Looking only at the 
gnevance-challence aspects of union-management interactions, two basic 
union décisions and two management décisions can be identified. First, 
the union must décide whether to challenge a particular management 
action (or failure to act) and then, if a challenge is decided on., must 
décide on the nature of the challenge. The nature of the challenge can 
be either formai, i.e. a written grievance, or informai, essentially oral in 
character. A third union décision may need to be made, concerning the 
person to whom the challenge should be directed, but in many cases, the 
nature of the challenge détermines its direction. 
The nature of the union challenge conditions managements response. 
An informai challenge may be ignored ; a formai, written grievance; must, 
under the agreement be answered. The 'how to respond' part of manage-
ment^ set of décisions may be viewed as requiring a décision as to the 
substantive issue raised by the union challenge. 
Thèse two sets of décisions exist at every step of the grievance pro-
cédure. Of course, some procédures provide for an oral first step, but even 
where such a procédure is outlined, an informai union challenge is still 
possible, informai in the sensé that it is not directed at the management 
level indicated by the contractually outlined procédure. 
In gênerai, the rate of union challenge is dépendent, at least in part, 
on the state of the union-management relationship and the length of the 
time-span over which that relationship has existed. Clearly, a union-ma-
nagement relationship rooted in conflict is likely to increase the number 
of challenges to management décisions, either in the form of grievances 
or in the use of pressure tactics. The following analysis will not wholly 
apply to thèse situations, nor to situations where the relationship is rela-
tively young, nor, perhaps, to situations where union-management rela-
tionship is one of active co-operation, as where Scanlon-type places are 
operative. 
Also by way of introduction, it may be said that grievances can be 
divided into five groups : 
1) Cases arising out of plain violations of the agreement by the 
employer. 
2) Cases arising out of disagreements over facts. 
3) Cases in which the essential issue is the meaning of the agree-
ment between the union and the company. 
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4) Cases involving the method of applying the agreement. 
5) Cases involving différences of opinion as to the reasonableness 
or fairness of various actions *. 
Aside from plain and simple violations of the agreement, unions hâve 
a great deal of latitude in deciding whether to challenge a particular 
management action. The factors which influence thèse décisions are the 
focus of this paper. 
I propose to examine the variables impinging upon the décision sets 
outlined above, the variables which help détermine which décision will 
be made. Particular emphasis will be placed on the factors influencing 
union décisions, since thèse décisions, in turn, hâve a strong influence on 
the set of management décisions. 
THE UNION DECISION SET 
To Challenge 
The first décision in the Union Set, whether to challenge, is seen as 
being influenced by three variables : Union policies, Union politics, and 
Union leadership. 
Union Policies — Some union challenges to management décisions 
are almost automatic in that the local union or a particular work group 
pursues a policy of filing a written grievance on every instance of a 
particular management décision. For example, one local union followed 
a policy or grieving every change in method of technology that had an 
impact on the workforce either in the form of réduction in skill (and pay) 
requirements or réductions in force. Further, union policy dictated that 
such grievances be carried to arbitration. This policy was pursued in the 
face of a management policy which provided very careful documentation 
of each technical or method change with pre-change and post-change 
studies by industrial engineering staff. Managements décisions had never 
been modified by an arbitrator, but the union nevertheless continued to 
follow its policy of grieving every change in work place conditions. 
Another local union followed a policy of grieving every new job 
classification or job re-classification and pushing the grievance to the 
1 Summer H. SLICHTER, James J. HEALY and E. Robert LIVERNASH, The Impact 
of Collective Bargaining on Management, Washington, D. C , The Brookings Insti-
tution, 1960, pp. 694-95. 
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fourth step of a five-step procédure, where the issue was handled by a 
représentative of the International Union and représentatives of the cor-
poration^ industrial relations and industrial engineering staffs. If the issue 
was not resolved at the fourth step, it was taken to arbitration, but most 
cases were resolved prior to arbitration. The union followed this policy 
in every instance, even where there was no disagreement at the local level 
as to the proper job classification. 
In another instance, a work group, in this case a millwright group 
in a maintenance départaient filed a grievance over every management 
décision to contract out work normally done by the millwrights. At the 
time, the group was working a 48-hour week and the management sub-
contracting décisions were based on the fact that work could not be done 
by the millwrights in question. The grievances were taken to the third 
step of a four-step procédure, where the workers received assurances from 
management, in writing, that the work had been contracted ont only 
because the department's présent work load required it, that the décision 
was no reflection on the millwright's ability to do the work, and that in 
the future, such work would be done in the plant if the workload per-
mitted it. 
While the rationale behind the policy-based actions of the three local 
unions in question varied, the results were the same. On particular issues, 
union policy dictated an affirmative answer to the question of whether to 
challenge, and the policy could be seen to be influenced in turn by the 
nature of the problem. The décision to challenge was automatic, and the 
form of the challenge, i.e., a formai, written grievance, was also dictated 
by the policy. 
At the risk of appearing cynical, a further ramification of the nature 
of the issue can be noted hère. Issues related to lost earnings opportunities 
had a tendency to be challenged through the grievance procédure. A mis-
schedule, or the loss of an overtime opportunity, or the mis-assignment 
of work to another individual or work group ail could be protested, and 
payment could be sought for time not worked. Such challenges had the 
potential of providing monetary rewards to individuals at no real cost to 
them, and thus were a likely source of grievances. Thèse challenges could 
be seen to be a function of past success in this area, and, as will be seen 
shortly, union leadership. 
Union Politics — In ail of the locations studied, the grievance rate 
increased during union élection years. Because of the political nature of 
union, departmental stewards, committeemen, or grievance représentatives 
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were much less inclined to refuse to pursue a problem through the griev-
ance procédure when an élection was imminent. An increase in militancy, 
and a démonstration that a particular union représentative was able to 
« do the job » were apparently necessary if the représentative was to 
receive a fresh mandate from his work group, forestall a challenge, or 
actually defeat a challenge. Thus, the prospect of an élection could be 
seen to push a steward toward an affirmative answer to the question, 
« Should I challenge ? » 
Apart from élection pressures, certain management décisions were 
challenged because of individual or work-group pressures even though the 
contract may not hâve been violated by the décision. Disciplinary actions 
were a prime exemple of this type of situation. On several occasions, 
stewards were seen to file grievances protesting disciplinary actions even 
though they privately acknowledged that the discipline was deserved. The 
action taken was rationalized by statements like, « Even if a guy is wrong, 
he still deserves his day in court, » or « Nothing makes a person madder 
than discipline he doesn't think he deserves ; it's better to file a grievance 
than to try to argue with him. » 
In the instances observed, a device was available which allowed the 
steward to dispose of the problem without incurring any political liabilities. 
The device was a union screening committee which usually operated at 
the third step of a five-step procédure, the point at which jurisdiction over 
a case passed from, the departmental grievance représentative to the plant 
grievance représentative. In short, the screening committee could décide 
not (with or without pressure from an individual grievance représentative) 
to pursue a grievance any further, and the onus of the failure to continue 
to prosecute the case would fall on the committee as a whole and not on 
the individual départaient représentative. 
Union Leadership — The most conspicuous variable affecting the 
union décision to challenge a particular management action is the nature 
of union leadership. In the course of the study five distinct types or patterns 
of union leadership were observed. Thèse types, and their impact on the 
challenge décision were as follows : 
Inactive leadership was seen at only one location, and, only in the 
présence of an agressive, policy-oriented management, which took pains 
to follow the collective agreement to the letter. Also, the technical environ-
ment was quite stable. In this instance, the grievance rate was very low 
— few management décisions were challenged, formally or informally. 
Individual foremen did not know who the départaient grievance repre-
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sentatives were, indicating a lack of contact between thèse two groups. 
While there were probably fewer-than-average opportunities to challenge 
management décisions in this department, the department had a very high 
grievance rate in prior years, indicating that the low rate found at the time 
of the study was at least partially a function of a union reluctance to 
challenge management décisions. 
The second type of union leadership found was called problem-
solving. This pattern of behaviour was found in grievance représentatives 
in several low-grievance rate departments. One outstanding characteristic 
of this type of leadership was a willingness to tell potential grievants that 
they did not hâve a case, Le. to refuse to process a grievance or to 
challenge a management décision. A second characteristic was a pré-
férence for informai resolution, and thèse individuals resorted to formal-
written grievances only as a last resort. 
A third type of union leader was called the advocate. This type of 
leader tended to take almost a lawyer's point of view regarding challenges 
to management : if an employée had a grievance, this type of leader would 
file the charge and carry it as far as he could, without regard for the 
merits of the case. In sum, « My client, right or wrong. » In an extrême 
manifestation, an individual following this leadership pattern continued 
to take virtually identical cases to arbitration in the face of the refusai of 
permanent umpire to accept the union's point of view. 
Yet another leadership style was found in the individual called the 
politician. Only one example of this style was observed, and there is some 
question as to whether it was a distinct style. The individual in question 
was seeking a higher union elected office and was in gênerai attempting 
to make himself look good at the company's expense. At the time of the 
study he was pursuing the tactic of filing many grievances, again without 
regard to the merits of individual cases, and then refused to meet with 
management in an attempt to discuss and résolve the issues. He then, to 
the work group, placed the blâme for the delays on management. The 
chief différence between the politician and the advocate did not appear 
to be in the nature of the challenge, but in differing desires for resolution 
of challenges. 
The final leadership pattern observed was that of the radical or man-
with-a-cause. Two examples were observed hère ; one individual was a 
civil rights militant and the other a political radical. Both individuals 
tended to exhibit a high frequency of challenge to management décisions, 
perhaps abnormally high, because of a personal frame of référence that 
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perceived management actions in terms of discrimination or exploitation. 
Thus management action was scrutinized in terms of both contractual 
rights and individual rights, both usually unfavourably and in a highly 
critical manner, with the union leader holding strong convictions of 
management bias. 
The latter two types of union leadership also tended to challenge 
management actions in ways outside the grievance procédure. Appeals 
were made to the labour board, for employment commissions, state and 
municipal agencies. Resort was also made to the news média when possible. 
In sum, inactive types of union leaders tended not to challenge 
management décisions. The problem-solver tended to challenge less than 
the advocate, the politician or the radical. Radical leadership evidenced 
a higher propensity to challenge than either the advocate or the politician. 
How To Challenge 
In examining the rôle of union leadership in the décision to challenge, 
we hâve also seen that it affects the décision how to challenge as well. 
The inactive type of union leadership tended not to challenge. Problem-
solver types of leaders tended to challenge informally, while advocates, 
politicians, and radicals ail tended to challenge formally. Three other 
factors were observed to relate to the union décision on whether to 
challenge formally or informally. They are the technology of the task, the 
nature of the community environment, and the nature of the management 
decision-making process. 
Task Technology — The nature of jobs in a particular départaient 
can be seen to affect the degree to which challenges can be made infor-
mally. Informai resolution was difficult or impossible under some task 
structures observed in the research and promoted by others. As an 
example of the latter, a batch process, like open hearth opérations in the 
steel industry, provided built-in breaks during which problems could be 
discussed. In some other opérations, such as a blooming mill, spell-men 
were used which provided opporrunities for some challenge or discussion. 
In other situations, such as a wire fabricating opération, in which 
machines were run by individuals on a piece-rate incentive, an informai 
challenge meant a loss of production and a loss of income. In this situation, 
challenges tended to be formai and the grievance-rate high. Similarly, a 
maintenance départaient doing work ail over a large steel mill provided 
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little opportunity for worker-management interaction in gênerai and little 
opportunity for informai challenge. 
Community Environment — In addition to the work place environ-
ment described above, the community environment affects the union 
décision on how to challenge. In gênerai, the smaller the community the 
greater is the propensity to informai challenge. 
The reasons behind this phenomena are simple. In a smaller com-
munity union and management generally had increased off the job 
contacts, more knowledge of each other's personal background and présent 
situation, and may hâve, as was observed in one instance, even lived next 
door to each other2. 
The Management Decision-Making Process — The third and most 
important variable influencing the second décision in the union set is 
found in the management decision-making process. In ail of the companies 
studied the expertise and real decision-making power rested with labour 
relations staff and not line management. Labour relations staff was 
responsible for the final step of the grievance procédure at the plant level, 
for the fourth step (if there was one) at the corporate level, and for 
handling the case in arbitration. In order for a union représentative to 
hâve the final authoritative management view of a case, he would hâve 
to bring it to the attention of the labour relations department. 
In some instances the line-staff relationship was such that line 
management could submit even informai challenges or complaints to 
labour relations staff for considération ; in others such submission was 
deferred. In either of thèse instances, informai challenges could receive 
labour relations attention, a fact which encouraged informai challenge and 
informai resolution. 
In other situations, labour relations staff did not or would not con-
sider an issue until it had been reduced to writing. In still others, the issue 
was not considered by labour relations until it had reached the third step 
of the grievance procédure where labour relations staff is responsible for 
hearings. Both of thèse types of decision-making processes encouraged 
formai challenge, i.e., written grievances, but also their pursuit to a rela-
tively high level of the grievance procédure. 
2
 For an interesting and further illustrative study of a plant in a small com-
munity see — Alvin W. GOULDNER, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, New York, 
The Free Press, 1954. 
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THE MANAGEMENT DECISION SET 
To Respond 
As was noted earlier, managements options in deciding whether to 
respond to a union grievance challenge are somewhat circumscribed by 
contractual obligations. Management must respond to a written grievance. 
The décision on whether to respond to an informai challenge seems to be 
primarily a function of management leadership style. A smaller range of 
leadership styles was observed in managers than in union leaders. Basi-
cally, three types of management styles were seen : Inactive, Problem-
solving and Autocratie. 
Inactive managers tended to avoid dealing with challenges, deferring 
to labour relations staff in this regard. Informai challenges were dis-
couraged or ignored, and the union resorted to written challenges to bring 
the issue before labour relations staff. 
Problem-solving managers were similar to their union counterparts. 
Management errors were admitted, and informai challenge and resolution 
were encouraged. Problem-solving types of managers were observed in 
situations where they relied heavily on labour relations staff advice and 
where they acted with a high degree of independence. 
Autocratie managers resisted and resented challenges of any type. 
By définition, management décisions were considered to be « right » and 
unchallengeable. Certainly, informai attempts were usually dismissed with 
an expression of the thought that if the steward or employée were dis-
satisfied he could file a written grievance. 
Of course, thèse behaviour patterns on the part of managers tended 
to be répétitive and thus conditioned the nature of the union challenge, 
and only problem-solving types of managers and union représentatives 
tended to evolve a consistently informai challenge-response interaction. 
One further management décision point of note involves a union 
challenge directly to labour relations staff. Ail of the contractually-out-
lined grievance procédures examined provided that the initial union chal-
lenge had to be directed toward the lower levels of line management. 
Because labour relations staff had the real expertise and authority in 
regard to grievance challenges, union représentatives were tempted to 
présent informai challenges directly to labour relations staff personnel. 
Labour relations personnel usually decided not to handle thèse complaints 
directly, preferring instead to involve line management, and directed the 
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union représentative to the manager responsible for the question. As such, 
this represented a policy décision to follow the contractually-outlined 
procédure. 
How To Respond 
Because of contractual obligations, management really only lias an 
option of responding or not responding to an informai union challenge, 
with a négative response producing a formai challenge. A positive response 
that insists on a réduction of the challenge to writing is essentially the 
same décision as a négative response. Thus a positive response to an 
informai union challenge must be similarly informai — an attempt to 
solve the problem without recourse to the formai, written grievance 
procédure. The « how-to-respond ? » question in the management set, in 
the sensé that this question or décision exists in the union set, is insépara-
ble from the décision on whether to respond. 
In a real sensé, the « how-to-respond ? » part of the management 
set calls for a décision on the substantive issues raised by the union chal-
lenge. In brief, three alternatives are available : yes, no and a compromise 
of some sort. 
Generalizing about the factors which influence this particular décision 
is difficult. Clearly, the exact nature of the issue raised would be of 
primary importance. As observed in the study, in the early stages of a 
grievance challenge, management tended to a much greater extent than 
the union did to be concerned with how the issue might be viewed by an 
arbitrator, and the probability of winning a case in arbitration. This was 
based on their own past expériences with arbitrators as well as arbitration 
rulings in the industry and was a prime factor in deciding how to respond 
to a union grievance challenge. This was particularly true in the U.S. Steel 
industry with a highly centralized negotiating process and an arbitration 
process based heavily on industry précèdent, and might not apply as much 
in other situations. 
In a situation where the parties did not rely heavily on arbitration 
(and no such situation was observed in the research discussed hère) 
factors other than the likely décision resulting from arbitral review would 
become important. The costs associated with a particular challenge, both 
in terms of monetary outlay and operating efficiency plus the applicabilité 
of the situation to other parts of the opération would probably tend to look 
larger in the decision-making process. 
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Management response might also be more conditioned by the type 
of union leadership. In the situation observed, challenges by moderate 
union leadership — that defined as the problem-solving type — usually 
received more favourable attention from management than challenges by 
other types of union leadership. Because problem-solving leadership was 
sélective in its challenges to management, thèse challenges made usually 
indicated an area of real concern to the workforce and, if nothing else, 
issues that were politically difficult for the union leadership to refuse to 
handle. Thus, in determining its response, management knew that the 
issue was of some importance to the workforce, and efforts to mitigate 
the impact of the original management décision could produce real 
dividends in terms of the gênerai union-management relationship. 
LA PRISE DE DÉCISION DANS LA PROCÉDURE 
DE RÈGLEMENT DES RÉCLAMATIONS 
La prise de décision en matière de règlement des griefs suscite toute une série 
d'interactions entre le syndicat et la direction. Le présent article est fondé sur une 
étude qui s'est faite dans cinq entreprises de sidérurgie aux États-Unis au cours des 
années 1967 et 1968. Le travail a consisté dans l'analyse des dossiers, dans des 
entrevues et des observations diverses. Évidemment, les constatations ne portent que 
sur une seule industrie, celle de l'acier mais, à quelques nuances près, elles sont 
susceptibles de valoir d'une façon générale, du moins dans l'industrie manufacturière. 
Les cas, qui ont été analysés, peuvent se diviser en cinq groupes distincts : la 
violation de la convention collective par l'employeur, le désaccord sur des faits, 
l'interprétation de la convention collective, la façon dont la convention est appli-
quée, les divergences d'opinion au sujet des méthodes d'action. 
D'une part, on s'est intéressé d'abord au comportement du syndicat qui peut 
différer selon sa conception de l'action syndicale, selon son état en tant qu'institution 
de nature politique. Certains syndiqués s'attaquent automatiquement aux décisions 
patronales et présentent des griefs formels à chaque fois que l'occasion s'en présente. 
D'autres syndicats s'attaquent principalement aux nouvelles classifications d'emploi 
et les griefs de ce genre se règlent généralement en présence du représentant inter-
national ou sont soumis à l'arbitrage. D'autres, par exemple, combattent vigoureu-
sement la sous-traitance. Enfin, des griefs formels sont soumis et portés à l'arbitrage 
chaque fois qu'un salarié ou un groupe de salariés a quelque raison d'espérer de 
l'arbitrage un avantage matériel quelconque. 
La situation politique au sein du syndicat exerce aussi une influence certaine 
sur la façon de traiter les griefs. Le nombre des griefs a tendance à augmenter 
lorsqu'il y a lutte entre différents clans à l'intérieur du syndicat et l'attitude à 
l'endroit des réclamations revêt alors une saveur électorale. On observe aussi un 
phénomène identique lorsque des groupes de pression se forment pour combattre 
une décision patronale dans un département. 
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Toutefois, du côté syndical, le principal facteur qui influe su? le traitement des 
griefs est sans conteste l'attitude des dirigeants. On peut, à ce propos, classer les 
dirigeants syndicaux en cinq catégories : il y a les inactifs, les chefs soucieux de 
régler les problèmes, les avocats et, finalement, les radicaux et les politiciens. 
Selon ces différents types de dirigeants syndicaux, on procédera différemment 
dans le traitement des griefs. L'inactif ne bouge pas : le véritable négociateur a 
tendance à éviter la présentation de griefs écrits et à discute? au mérite chaque cas 
soumis ; l'avocat est enclin à défendre la cause jusqu'au bout, qu'elle soit bonne ou 
non ; quant aux politiciens, ils amassent du capital et, avec les radicaux, ils con-
testent systématiquement les décisions patronales. 
La nature du travail, l'organisation de l'entreprise et le milieu ambiant jouent 
aussi un rôle sur le nombre des griefs et la façon de les traiter. Ainsi, dans une 
localité dont la population est peu nombreuse sera-t-on plus enclin à discuter les 
griefs d'une façon informelle. Enfin, il faut noter que la façon dont procède la 
direction dans la prise de décision et l'organisation même du service de relations du 
travail comptent pour beaucoup dans la façon dont les syndicats agissent en matière 
de traitement des réclamations. Il arrive que le service des relations du travail ne 
bouge pas tant qu'il n'est pas en présence d'un grief présenté par écrit en bonne 
et due forme. 
Du côté patronal, l'attitude des dirigeants peut se comparer dans une certaine 
mesure à celle des chefs syndicaux. L'enquête a permis de déceler qu'il y a des 
employeurs inactifs qui cherchent à éluder les problèmes ou se contentent de référer 
les cas soumis au service des relations du travail, les dirigeants soucieux de régler 
les problèmes d'une façon informelle tout comme leurs collègues syndicaux et, enfin, 
les employeurs autocratiques, qui, au nom du principe de l'autorité, ont pour politique 
de défendre jusqu'au bout ce qu'ils considèrent être de leurs prérogatives qu'elles 
soient justes ou non, et qui sont fermés à toute forme; de compromis. Ces attitudes 
de base se reflètent naturellement dans la façon de traiter les griefs aux différentes 
étapes de la procédure. 
Dans l'ensemble, on peut dire que, en règle générale, l'attitude des employeurs 
dépend beaucoup de celle des chefs syndicaux, et il y a là une interaction certaine. 
Il faut aussi noter que, aux étapes préliminaires de la discussion, les employeurs 
sont sensibles à ce que serait la décision d'un arbitre ou d'un tribunal d'arbitrage. 
Ils tiennent généralement compte du coût financier du litige et aussi des avan-
tages que peuvent apporter à longue échéance des compromis acceptables. 
En bref, le syndicat, devant un grief, doit décider s'il doit le défendre et com-
ment il lui faut le défendre : d'autre part, sujet aux stipulations du contrai:, l'em-
ployeur se place dans une situation à peu près identique de défense. 
